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TR-99-8

November 1999

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Abstract

In a recent report we proposed an architectural construct to address the problem of dealing with *timeliness* specifications in a generic way. We called it the Timely Computing Base, TCB. The TCB defines a set of services available to applications, including timely execution, duration measurement and timing failure detection. We showed how these services could be used to build dependable and timely applications. In this paper we further extend the description of the TCB, namely by presenting a protocol for its Timing Failure Detection (TFD) service. We discuss the essential aspects of providing such a service under the TCB framework and make some considerations relative to the service interface.

1 Introduction

In the last few years we have assisted to the expansion of distributed systems and to the appearance of more demanding applications. While many of these applications can take advantage of growing system capabilities like processing speed, storage size or memory size, others have requirements, like real-time or fault-tolerance, that do not depend exclusively on hardware capabilities.

For instance, the implementation of services with high interactivity or mission-criticality requirements must be based on solid and adequate system models and correct software protocols. This kind of services are usually demanding in terms of *timeliness*, either because of dependability constraints (e.g. air traffic control, telecommunication intelligent network architectures) or because of user-dictated quality-of-service requirements (e.g. network transaction servers, mul-

timedia rendering, synchronized groupware). An intuitive approach to cope with such timeliness needs is to use a synchronous system model. However, large-scale, unpredictable and unreliable infrastructures cause synchronous system models to work incorrectly. On the other hand, asynchronous models do not satisfy our needs because they do not allow timeliness specifications.

In order to clarify the problem and create a generic framework to deal with this problem, we introduced the **Timely Computing Base (TCB)** model. It assumes that any system, regardless of its synchrony properties, can rely on services provided by a special module, the TCB, which is timely, that is, synchronous. In this paper we further extend the description of the TCB, namely by proposing a protocol for its Timing Failure Detection (TFD) service. We show that synchronized clocks are not required to implement such a TFD service. We also analyze the problem of node crashes – how this affects the TFD service – and propose a solution to deal with it. To keep the protocol generic we do not assume any specific environment or computational platform.

The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents some related work. Section 3 describes the TCB model and its services. Section 4 is dedicated to the presentation and discussion of the TFD service. In section 5 we discuss some issues related to the service interface. Finally, we conclude with a summary of what has been done and highlight some topics for future work.

2 Related Work

The problem of failure detection is strictly related to system assumptions. In the past few years, several authors have addressed this problem under different perspectives and assuming varying degrees of synchronism properties. One of the first known results, derived for fully asynchronous systems, describes the impossibility of distributed consensus in the presence

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of failures [11]. In such a time-free model the specification of a useful failure detector (one that could allow some progress) turns out to be impossible.

Chandra & Toueg proposed a classification model for failure detectors [5]. The merit of their work lies in the formal way the problem was treated, and how they managed to isolate and specify the exact properties determining the possibility or impossibility of solving various distributed system problems like consensus, atomic broadcast or leader election.

The timed asynchronous model adds some synchronism to the system by assuming the existence of local hardware clocks with bounded drift rate [7]. This allows processes to measure the passage of time and use timeouts. In timed systems it is possible to construct a special failure detector, a fail-aware failure detector [8], which can be implemented if some additional progress assumptions are made. In [10], Fetzer proposes an approach to calculate upper bounds for the transmission delay of messages inspired on the round-trip clock reading method [6]. Our work uses these results as a building block to construct the timing failure detection service.

The quasi-synchronous model introduces the notion of timing failure detectors [13]. In [2], Almeida describes a TFD service for the quasi-synchronous model which assumes local clocks are synchronized and is used as a specific tool to implement a group communication protocol providing total temporal order. In a more recent work, it was shown that the timing failure detector has such properties that allow a timely failure detection, so that, despite the eventual failure of synchrony assumptions, protocols can adapt to timing failures and allow the system to remain correct [3]. The TFD service we propose in this paper also has these properties. However, its construction is ruled by other objectives. First, we show that it is possible to timely detect timing failures without synchronized clocks. Second, we propose a self-contained service with a clearly defined objective, which is solely the provision of timeliness information about events occurring in the system. As opposed to the service presented in [2], no application related information can be sent through this service. Finally, we envisage a TFD service that gives more than just timeliness related information since it may keep, and manage, historical information about the system behavior.

3 The TCB Model

The assumed system model is composed of participants or processes (both designations are used inter-

changeably) which exchange messages, and may exist in several sites or nodes of the system. Sites are interconnected by a communication network. The system can have any degree of synchronism, that is, if bounds exist for processing or communication delays, their magnitude may be uncertain or not known. Local clocks may not exist or may not have a bounded rate of drift towards real time.

In terms of fault assumptions, the system is assumed to follow an omissive failure model. This means that components *only do timing failures*— and of course, omission and crash, since they are subsets of timing failures— no value failures occur.

Given the above assumptions, systems have to face the problem of uncertain timeliness (bounds may be violated) while still being dependable with regard to time (timely executing certain functions). This can be achieved if processes in the system have access to a *Timely Computing Base*, a component that performs the following functions on their behalf: timely execution, duration measurement, timing failure detection. In this paper we deal with the latter and define the protocols and interfaces for a Timing Failure Detection service.

There is one local Timely Computing Base at every site, fulfilling the following requirements:

Interposition - the TCB position is such that no direct access to resources vital to timeliness can be made in default of the TCB

Shielding - the TCB construction is such that it is itself protected from faults affecting timeliness

Validation - the TCB functionality is such that it allows the implementation of verifiable mechanisms w.r.t. timeliness

Each local TCB enjoys the following synchronism properties:

Ps 1 *There exists a known upper bound $T_{D_{max}}^1$ on processing delays*

Ps 2 *There exists a known upper bound $T_{D_{max}}^2$ on the rate of drift of local clocks*

Property **Ps 1** refers to the determinism in the execution time of code elements by the TCB. Property **Ps 2** refers to the existence of a local clock in each TCB whose individual drift is bounded. This allows measuring local durations, i.e., the interval between two local events. These clocks are internal to the TCB. Remember that the general system may or not have clocks.




Figure 1: The TCB Architecture

A distributed TCB is the collection of all local TCBs in a system, interconnected by a communication means by which local TCBs exchange messages. The interposition, shielding and validation requirements must also be satisfied by the distributed TCB such as the communication among local TCBs, which must still be synchronous. Property **Ps 3** refers to the determinism in the time to exchange messages among participants via the TCB:

Ps 3 *There exists a known upper bound $T_{D_{max}}^3$, on message delivery delays*

The architecture of a system with a TCB is suggested by Figure 1. Whilst there is a generic, *payload* system over a global network, or *payload* channel, the system admits the construction of say, a *control* part, made of local TCB modules, interconnected by some form of medium, the *control* channel. The medium may be a virtual channel over the available physical network or a network in its own right. Processes p execute on the several sites, making use of the TCB whenever appropriate. The TCB subsystem, dashed in the figure, fulfills the *interposition*, *shielding* and *validation* requirements. Altogether, it preserves properties **Ps 1** to **Ps 3**.

The nature of the modules and the interconnection medium is outside the scope of this paper. The interested reader can refer to [14] where a few hints on how to implement a TCB are given.

4 The TFD Service

In this section we present and discuss a protocol the TCB Timing Failure Detection service. We first intro-

duce the formal definitions of *timing specification* and *timing failure*, that are necessary to subsequently understand how the TCB, and more specifically the TFD service, handles application timeliness requirements. Given that, we introduce the properties required for the TFD service and briefly overview what they imply in terms of system model. We then propose a generic protocol and prove it satisfies those properties.

4.1 Timing Specifications and Timing Failures

The TCB model considers the system to be specified in terms of (logical) safety and timeliness (safety) properties. Timeliness properties belong to the class of properties where, in order to verify their correctness, we need to specify and observe every individual run [12]. Each individual run can be characterized by a runtime timing specification, or simply *timing specification*, for an event to be produced by a process, as the latest real time instant when the event must take place. In consequence of an execution dictated by a given property, the component must obey one, several or infinitely many *timing specifications*. For example, timeliness property “any delivered message is delivered until T_d from the send request” translates, in a given run for a message M , to timing specification “for event `send_request(M)` issued at real time t_s , the event `delivery_of_message(M)` must occur by real time $t_s + T_d$ ”. We define timing specification:

Timing Specification - Given process p , event e , and real time instant t_e , a timing specification is: $S(p, e, t_e) \equiv p \text{ produces } e \text{ at } t \leq t_e$

The correctness of the execution of a timing specification is affected by timing failures:

Timing Failure - given the execution of a timing specification $S(p, e, t_e)$, there is a timing failure at t_e , iff e takes place at a real time instant t'_e , $t_e < t'_e \leq \infty$. The lateness degree is the delay of occurrence of e , $Ld = t'_e - t_e$.

An execution, or run R_i , of a timing specification S_i is a tuple $\langle i, S_i, T(i), \text{timely} \rangle$. For each specification $S(p, e, t_e)$, t_e is generated such that it is a function of a given duration \mathcal{T} dictated by a timeliness property: $t_e = f(\mathcal{T})$. In consequence, for a run i of S_i , there is a measurable duration $T(i)$ related to \mathcal{T} . That is, if a property says something about a *specified duration* \mathcal{T} (through a time operator), the *observed duration* $T(i)$ in run R_i is the measure of \mathcal{T} in that run. Finally, *timely* is a Boolean which is true if the timing

specification was executed on time, or false otherwise, according to the definition of timing failure.

4.2 TFD properties

As specified in the TCB model, the Timing Failure Detector service must have the following properties:

TFD 1 Timed Strong Completeness: *There exists $T_{TFD_{max}}$ such that given any timing failure of p in a specification $\mathcal{S}(p, e, t_e)$, the TCB detects it at a real time instant $t \leq t_e + T_{TFD_{max}}$*

TFD 2 Timed Strong Accuracy: *There exists $T_{TFD_{min}}$ such that given any specification $\mathcal{S}(p, e, t_e)$, and the occurrence of e at p , at any real time instant $t \leq t_e - T_{TFD_{min}}$, the TCB considers p timely*

These quite strong properties, that define a *Perfect Timing Failure Detector (pTFD)*, can only be guaranteed if certain conditions are met. The underlying system synchrony is the crucial factor dictating whether or not these properties can be satisfied. Remember we are now considering the environment under which the TCB and its services are run. In totally asynchronous, or *time-free* systems, it is obviously impossible to construct such a timing failure detection service since by definition the notion of time (thus of timing failures) is absent. Adding a short amount of synchrony, namely by allowing processes to access a local clock with bounded drift rate, it becomes possible to tackle problems with timeliness specifications. In particular, it is possible to detect *late events* and to construct fail-aware services [9]. However, achieving simultaneously the two properties required for perfect timing failure detection is still not possible [4]. That is only possible, in fact, if the model over which the TFD service is constructed is, at least in part, synchronous. This has implications both in terms of the communication medium and at the operating system level. There must exist a synchronous *control* channel interconnecting every local TCB module and the system must be scheduled in order to ensure that TCB tasks are hard real-time tasks, immune to timing faults in the other tasks.

4.3 TFD protocol

The problem we have to solve is how to build a timing failure detector which satisfies properties **TFD 1** and **TFD 2**. This requires a protocol to be executed by all TFD modules on top of the above-mentioned synchronous control channel. To better understand

the intuition behind the protocol we will proceed step by step and discuss some aspects we consider relevant.

Any timing specification describes an event that must take place at a specific time instant. Thus, a new timing specification is issued whenever some action dictates an event to occur at some later time. We make a clear distinction between an *event* and its corresponding *timing specification*. If the event occurs it may do so at any given instant. The timing specification tells the allowed interval of timely occurrence of the event.

We further consider the existence of two kinds of events. Those that occur locally to the TCB where they were specified, and those that occur in a remote site. Then, we also distinguish the timing specifications of such events: the former are described by *local specifications*, and the later by *remote specifications*. Formally, a specification $\mathcal{S}(p, e, t_e)$ is local if it is generated by processor p and remote otherwise (when generated by some $q \neq p$).

In practice, local specifications are issued whenever there is a local function execution. The event referred to in the specification consists on the function termination. Remote specifications are issued when a message is sent to another site. In this case the specification refers to the remote receive event.

In the TCB model, an event timing failure can only be signaled if its corresponding specification is known, that is, it is necessary to know the deadline for that event. For local events this is not a problem since the specification is locally available. However, for remote ones this requires the timing specification to be delivered to the appropriate TCB module. This, in part, justifies the necessity of a protocol that allows TCB modules to exchange and share information. Another reason is due to the requirement for timely detection. In fact, timely detection can only be achieved if there is a protocol which forces the TFD to make a decision in a bounded time. Simply waiting for an event to occur is certainly not sufficient.

Making decisions about timeliness of events is based on time values. According to the formal specification of *timing failure*, a TFD module detects a timing failure if the event occurs at a real time instant greater than the deadline instant of its specification. Since the TCB model only assumes the existence of local clocks (property **Ps 2**) and does not even require clocks to be synchronized, reasoning in terms of a global time frame is not possible. Consequently, another methodology must be chosen. Using local clock values to specify deadlines is a simple and acceptable solution for local specifications. But for remote specifications ab-

solute time values must be replaced by relative ones, that is, the arrival deadline on the remote local clock must be specified in terms of a duration related with the message send time. This requires some form of relating both clocks. The round-trip duration measurement technique described in [6] can be used for this purpose.

In what follows we present and describe the TFD protocol. Since local and remote specifications can be treated differently we first deal with failure detection of remote events and only then present a brief description of an algorithm to handle local timing failures.

Remote timing failure detection

The protocol that implements the “remote” part of the TFD service is presented in figure 2. It is executed in rounds, during which each TFD instance broadcasts all information relative to new (remote) timing specifications and to specifications evaluated during last interval (since last round). The protocol uses three tables to store this information: a *Timing Specifications Table* (TSTable), an *Event Table* (ETable) and a *Log Table* (LTable). The TSTable holds information about timing specifications that must be delivered to remote sites during the next round. The ETable maintain information about timing specifications and receive events, which will be used later to make the decisions. The last table is where timing failure decisions are output and is also used to keep timeliness information of past events.

Activity within the TCB is triggered by a user request to send a message (line 8). We assume the TCB is capable of intercepting send requests, since it occupies a privileged position in the system. How this is done is an implementation issue out of the scope of this paper. Upon intercepting a message, a unique message identifier mid is generated (using some function $get_uniqId()$) and assigned to both the message and the specification (lines 9-11). This identifier makes the association between a message and a timing specification and it must be unique within the (distributed) TCB to avoid wrong associations.

The intercepted message is then sent to the payload channel using a special *timed-send* service, which inserts additional timestamping information in the message. This is required to allow the computation, at the receiver, of an upper bound for the effective message transmission delay. A detailed description of this technique can be found in [10]. The *timed-receive()* function, counterpart of *timed-send()*, delivers the measured transmission delay (T_{mid}) and the receive timestamp (T_{rec}) values (line 17).

For each TFD_p instance

```

01 //  $T_{send}$  is the duration of send actions
02 //  $r$  is round number
03 //  $\Pi$  is the period of a TFD round
04 //  $C(t)$  returns the local clock value at real-time  $t$ 
05 //  $\mathcal{R}_{TST}$  is the set of all records in TSTable
06 //  $\mathcal{R}_{ET}$  is the set of all complete records the in ETable
07
08 when user requests to send  $\langle m \rangle$  to  $\mathcal{D}$  do
09    $mid := get\_uniqId()$ ;
10   timed-send( $\langle m, mid \rangle, \mathcal{D}$ ); // to payload channel
11   insert ( $mid, \mathcal{D}, T_{send}$ ) in TSTable;
12 od
13 when  $C(t) = r\Pi$  do
14   broadcast ( $\langle \mathcal{R}_{TST}, \mathcal{R}_{ET} \rangle$ ); // to control channel
15    $r := r + 1$ ;
16 od
17 when timed-receive( $\langle m, mid \rangle, q, T_{mid}, T_{rec}$ ) do
18   if  $\exists R \in ETable : R.mid = mid$  then
19      $R.T_{mid} := T_{mid}$ ;
20      $R.q := q$ ;
21     if  $R.Complete = False$  then
22       stop (timer $\langle mid \rangle$ );
23        $R.Complete := True$ ;
24     fi
25   else
26     insert ( $mid, T_{mid}, q, \perp, False$ ) in ETable;
27   fi
28   deliver ( $\langle m \rangle, mid, T_{rec}, q$ ) to user ;
29 od
30 when message  $\langle \mathcal{R}_{TST}, \mathcal{R}_{ET} \rangle$  received from  $q$  do
31   foreach ( $mid, \mathcal{D}, T_{send}$ )  $\in \mathcal{R}_{TST} : p \in \mathcal{D}$  do
32     if  $\exists R \in ETable : R.mid = mid$  then
33        $R.T_{send} := T_{send}$ ;
34        $R.Complete := True$ ;
35     else
36       insert ( $mid, \perp, \perp, T_{send}, False$ ) in ETable;
37       start (timer $\langle mid \rangle$ ,  $T_{send}$ );
38     fi
39   od
40   foreach ( $mid, q, T_{mid}, T_{send}$ )  $\in \mathcal{R}_{ET}$  do
41     if  $T_{mid} = \perp$  then
42        $Failed := True$ ;
43     else if  $T_{mid} > T_{send}$  then
44        $Failed := True$ ;
45     else
46        $Failed := False$ ;
47     fi
48     insert ( $mid, q, T_{mid}, T_{send}, Failed$ ) in LTable;
49   od
50 od
51 when timer $\langle mid \rangle$  expires do
52   search  $R \in ETable : R.mid = mid$ ;
53    $R.Complete := True$ ;
54 od
```

Figure 2: Timing Failure Detection protocol.

After sending the message, a new record is added to the Timing Specifications Table (line 11). Each record contains the following items: the unique message identifier mid , the set of destination processes \mathcal{D} and the specified duration for the send action, T_{send} . The value of T_{send} is kept by the TCB but may be

changed at execution time. For instance, a Timeliness-Tuning Algorithm, as explained in [14] may do this. It is worthwhile to point out the generic and innovative perspective of assuming a dynamic system evolution in terms of timeliness parameters. In essence, this dynamic behavior allows a certain class of applications to adapt to environment changes and achieve *coverage stability*, as described in [14].

As said earlier, each TFD instance periodically disseminates new information concerning timing specifications and specification runs. The period Π depends on several factors, including the control channel bandwidth, the number of processes and the maximum amount of information sent in each round. Ideally, the value of Π should be the lowest possible to minimize the timing failure detection latency (see section 4.3). The TFD service wakes up, timely, when the local clock indicates it is time for a new round (line 13). The contents of the TSTable and the *complete* records in the ETable are then broadcast on the control channel. A record is considered *complete* (and marked accordingly) when all the information necessary to make a decision has been collected, or when this decision can be made solely with the timing specification information or if a special failure situation is detected (see section 4.3). The *Complete* field is not included in the control information. Figure 3 shows an Event Table record and indicates which events trigger the filling of each field.

Event Table Record		
	Mess Received	Spec Received
mid	×	×
T_{mid}	×	
q	×	
T_{send}		×
<i>Complete</i>	When all info received or timer expires	

Figure 3: Event Table record and filling triggering events.

Synchronization among TFD instances is not enforced. Therefore, dissemination rounds of all instances may be spread in an interval of duration Π . However, since we assume bounded delays for TCB tasks (property **Ps 1**) and a synchronous control channel (property **Ps 3**), the inter-arrival interval of control information from a given instance is bounded. This knowledge can be used, as we will see, to detect the crash of a TCB module.

A message arriving from the payload channel is received with the already mentioned *timed-receive()* function (line 17). This function is the one responsible

for calculating the message transmission delay and it does so using send and receive timestamps of a round-trip message pair. Since the exact transmission delay cannot be determined, its upper bound is used instead. The error associated to this upper bound yields the value of $T_{TFD_{min}}$ specified in property **TFD 2**.

When the message arrives, three situations are possible: (a) the timing specification has not arrived and thus there is no entry in ETable for the message; (b) there is an entry which is not complete; or (c) there is a complete entry for that message. As for (a), a new record is simply created with the received information (line 26). We use \perp to denote absence of value (or a special value). As for (b) and (c), a specification for message mid has already been received, so T_{mid} and the sender process identification, q , are stored in the existing record (lines 18-20). If the record is not yet complete, this means the TFD was still waiting for the message to arrive and so $timer_{mid}$ is stopped and *Complete* is set to *True* (lines 21-23). Otherwise, it means the message arrived late and a positive failure decision was, or will be made. Whichever is the case, in the end the message is always delivered to the user along with the (TFD internal) message identification and the receive instant timestamp (line 28). Note that the objective of the TFD service is just to provide information relative to timing failures within a bounded and known amount of time. No filtering of any kind is done to messages, and applications are free to handle the information provided by the TFD service in a manner that makes sense at their level of abstraction. But we will come back to this interesting interface problem in section 5.

Each message received from the control channel provides two kinds of information: timing specification records and complete event records. For a certain process p , the relevant timing specifications are those of messages delivered to p (line 31). Timing specifications of messages not yet received are inserted in ETable and a timer is started to allow a timely failure detection (lines 36-37). If the timer expires before the message arrives, the message will never be considered timely. Therefore, since we have to preserve property **TFD 2** assuring that timely messages are never considered late, the smallest timeout value we can use is T_{send} . This value is obtained assuming that a timing specification can be processed (by the remote site) as soon as it was generated. If a more pessimistic, although realistic assumption were made, the timeout value could be relaxed to a lower value¹. Nevertheless,

¹At least, the minimum message delivery time for the control channel could be taken into account.

this would not improve the maximum latency time for failure detection in the general case.

Complete event records are treated next. By then, the TFD service finally makes a decision: the specified delivery delay is compared with the measured one and the variable *Failed* is asserted a Boolean value (lines 41-47). If the value of T_{mid} is empty (\perp) this means that the record in ETable was marked complete because $timer_{\langle mid \rangle}$ expired and that the message did not arrive yet. The message is of course late. Each record in the LTable contains the (TFD) message identifier, the sender, the specified and measured durations and the *Failed* flag. We will see in section 5 possible uses for this information.

In the presented protocol we intentionally omitted the problem of table size and possible memory exhaustion to simplify the problem. Although it is simple to devise a solution to clean table records after the TFD has made the decisions, it may be useful to keep an history of timing specification runs, and this raises the problem of choosing an adequate criterion to make the deletions. Solutions to this problem can only be dealt with by taking into account the possible uses of the information, and these depend on the application.

Local timing failure detection

As noted above, detection of local timing failures can be done more easily than remote ones. In fact, since all events in a same site can be timestamped using the same local clock it is easy to measure time intervals between events. Hence, it is simple for the TCB to measure the duration of any executed function.

In figure 4 we present an algorithm to keep track of local timing failures. In this algorithm we assume that the TCB can intercept function calls and that recursion is not possible in function calls (an extended version of the algorithm could be devised to cope with this). We also assume that the specified duration T_f is known within the TFD service and is initialized to some value which can be changed by the application later on.

Again we are not too worried with the interface. The interesting feature is that we can have a service that measures timeliness of functions executed by the application. Whether the application uses this service, and how, is another problem that we will tackle in a future paper.

Perfect timing failure detection

We are now able to state the following theorem.

For each TFD instance

```

01 //  $T_f$  is the duration of function  $f$ 
02 //  $C(t)$  returns the local clock value at real-time  $t$ 
03 //  $R_f$  is a local record for function  $f$ 
04 // The  $R_f.T$  field keeps the specified duration
05 // The  $R_f.Start$  field stores the start timestamp
06 // The  $R_f.Run$  field stores the measured duration
07 // The  $R_f.Failed$  field indicates the failure decision
08
09 when user calls function  $f$  do
10   start ( $timer_f, T_f$ );
11    $R_f.T := T_f$ ;  $R_f.Run := \perp$ ;  $R_f.Failed := \perp$ ;
12    $R_f.Start := C(t)$ ;
13 od
14 when function  $f$  terminates do
15    $R_f.Run := C(t) - R_f.Start$ ;
16   if  $R_f.Failed = \perp$  then
17     stop ( $timer_f$ );
18      $R_f.Failed := False$ ;
19   fi
20 od
21 when  $timer_f$  expires do
22    $R_f.Failed := True$ ;
23 od

```

Figure 4: Algorithm for local timing failure detection.

Theorem 1 *The algorithms of figures 2 and 4 satisfy properties TFD 1 and TFD 2.*

INFORMAL PROOF:

The proof follows directly from the discussion of the protocols. Nevertheless we explain how the values of $T_{TFD_{max}}$ (TFD 1) and $T_{TFD_{min}}$ (TFD 2) are obtained. We only discuss the case for remote timing specification, since this is the harder one.

Consider the example depicted in figure 5. It illustrates a situation where a process p sends a message m to a process q with a specified duration of zero. Obviously, since no message can be sent instantaneously, a timing failure will occur as soon as the message is sent. Clearly, no timing failure can occur sooner than this. At worst, the TFD of processor p wakes up Π units of time after the timing failure, to send the specification of m into the control channel. This information is delivered at most Δ time units later to the TFD of processor q . It is inserted in the Event Table and the record for message m is marked as complete. This happens independently of m having arrived, since the timeout of $timer_{\langle mid \rangle}$ is set to zero (the value of T_{send}) and hence will expire immediately. Hence, it may be possible to wait another $\Pi + \Delta$ time units until TFD $_q$ disseminates the complete record to all TFD instances. Only then the decision about the timing specification will be made, that is, at most $2(\Pi + \Delta)$ after the timing failure.




Figure 5: Example of earliest timing failure and maximum detection latency.

The value of $T_{TFD_{max}}$ is then $2(\Pi + \Delta)$.

The value of $T_{TFD_{min}}$ derives from the error of the delivery delay measurement. Since the exact value of this delay is unknown, the higher bound is used to assure that a late event is never considered timely. In our protocol, the message delivery delay is measured by the *timed-send* service, which delivers the upper bound value. The associated error depends on the drift rate of local clocks (ρ_p, ρ_q), on the maximum drift rate (ρ), on the send and receive timestamps of a round-trip message pair $\langle m1, m2 \rangle$ ($S_{m1}, R_{m1}, S_{m2}, R_{m2}$), on the minimum message delivery delay (δ_{min}) and on the measured delivery delay of message $m1$ (T_{m1}). Assuming that $m1$ is first sent from q to p and then $m2$ from p to q , the error associated to the transmission delay of $m2$ can be expressed as follows [10]:

$$e(m2) = (R_{m2} - S_{m1})(\rho + \rho_q) + (S_{m2} - R_{m1})(\rho - \rho_p) + (T_{m1} - \delta_{min})$$

The value of $T_{TFD_{min}}$ is then $e(m)$.

□

Impact of crash failures

The discussion of possible implications of a TFD instance crash was postponed to this point since it raises some model related questions that, if presented earlier, could confuse the explanation of the protocol. We also did so because we believe that the cases described below do not compromise what has been said until now.

There are two situations in which the crash of a TFD instance must be carefully analyzed to prevent the misbehavior of remaining instances or, even worse, incorrect information to be output. The key issue is the loss of information that, in this case, concerns timing specifications and complete event results.

Figure 6 illustrates a situation in which the information contained in the TSTable is lost. When




Figure 6: Example of crash failure before specifications are sent to control channel.

process p sends m to q , TFD_p stores the timing information of m in TSTable. Normally, this information would then be delivered to TFD_q and inserted in ETable. However, if TFD_p crashes before sending the control message, the timing specification of m will be lost and therefore it will be impossible to decide about the timeliness of m . At first glance, this impossibility may seem a violation of properties **TFD 1** and **TFD 2**. However, the fact that a crash failure occurred can be detected and this allows a special decision to be taken without knowing the timeliness specification. Thus, while the TFD service cannot say if message m was timely or late, it indicates that a crash of processor p occurred and that no decision can be made. It is then up to the application to handle this information and act upon it.

A generic solution to the problem of crash detection was discussed by Almeida in [1]. In what follows we present a specific extension to the TFD protocol to handle TFD crashes, and then finalize the discussion of figure 6.

The extension protocol uses a timer for each active process, which is restarted every time new control information is received from that process (line 6). Since the channel is synchronous, the interval between the reception of successive control messages from a given process is bounded by $\Pi + \Delta$. Hence, if the timeout is set to this value, the timer will expire only if that process has crashed. In the figure it is possible to observe when TFD_q detects the crash of p . Since a decision has to be delivered, all pending events are marked as complete (lines 20-22). A set containing all crashed processes is maintained so that future decisions (for messages still in transit) can be taken (lines 25-26). At decision time, if the field containing the value of the specified duration is empty (\perp), the special empty value \perp will also be assigned to *Failed* in the LTable, meaning that it was not possible to make a decision

For each TFD_p instance

```

01 //  $\Pi$  is the period of a TFD round
02 //  $\Delta$  is the Max delivery delay in control channel
03 //  $\mathcal{C}$  is the set of crashed processes
04
05 when message  $\langle \mathcal{R}_{TST}, \mathcal{R}_{ET} \rangle$  received from  $q$  do
06   (re)start (timer $\langle TFD_q \rangle$ ,  $\Pi + \Delta$ );
07   if  $q \in \mathcal{C}$  then remove  $q$  from  $\mathcal{C}$  fi
08   (... treat  $\mathcal{R}_{TST}$  as before ...)
09   foreach  $(mid, r, T_{mid}, T_{send}) \in \mathcal{R}_{ET}$  do
10     if  $T_{send} = \perp$  then
11       Failed :=  $\perp$ ;
12     else
13       (... decide as before ...)
14     fi
15     insert  $(mid, q, T_{mid}, T_{send}, Failed)$  in LTable;
16   od
17 od
18 when timer $\langle TFD_q \rangle$  expires do
19   add  $q$  to  $\mathcal{C}$ ;
20   foreach  $R \in ETable : R.q = q$  do
21     R.Complete := True;
22   od
23 od
24 when timed-receive $(\langle m, mid \rangle, q, T_{mid}, T_{rec})$  do
25   if  $q \in \mathcal{C}$  then
26     insert  $(mid, T_{mid}, q, \perp, True)$  in ETable;
27   fi
28   deliver  $(\langle m \rangle, mid, T_{rec}, q)$  to user ;
29 od

```

Figure 7: Extension of the TFD protocol to handle crash failures.

(lines 10-11).

Having considered the possibility of crash failures, the value previously obtained for $T_{TFD_{max}}$ must be reconsidered. In fact, since the perception of a crash failure may take longer than the reception of control information, we get a value slightly higher than before. Observe figure 6 and suppose TFD_q only sends the control message Π time units after detecting the crash. Consider also that for the purpose of calculating $T_{TFD_{max}}$ we may admit that m suffered a timing failure as soon as it was sent. Then, the new value will be $2\Pi + 3\Delta$.

The other potential problem is due to the loss of information in the Event Table. Since this table contains results of specification runs, an intuitive approach would make them immediately available (in LTable) at the local site. However, if a crash occurred before the broadcast of those results, this would mean a decision had been taken in one site and not in the others. To prevent this, we assure that decisions are only made upon reception of ETable records, and so either all or none will output timeliness decisions.

5 TFD Service Interface

We have seen that remote timing specifications are generated upon interception of send requests and that local function calls are also intercepted by the TFD. This mode of operation was intentionally devised to obtain a transparent service invocation. This means that applications do not have to be modified to explicitly request a timeliness evaluation of each action they perform. Instead, they are allowed to configure timeliness parameters, namely by defining the required duration for a certain kind of action, and then only have to query the service to collect the results. This transparency can be useful to deal with different kinds of applications, specifically in terms of their synchrony assumptions.

The main source of information output by the TFD service is the Log Table, where timeliness information about events is kept. The idea to access this information is to have some kind of event identifier that is used to query the TFD service. This is why messages delivered to applications are accompanied by the identifier mid and by the receive instant timestamp. The application may not use these values, but if it wants it may use the timestamp to know when will the timeliness information be available (remember the $T_{TFD_{max}}$ constraint) and the mid to obtain it.

For a certain kind of applications it may be useful, at some moment, to know the activity in the payload channel. For instance, it may be interesting to know if there are any messages sent by some processor, which are supposed to be received. We know that the TFD service may be able to provide this information by checking the timeliness specifications registered in the Event Table. So it may be convenient to provide an interface to access this particular table.

6 Conclusions

The TCB model provides a framework to deal with application timeliness requirements. It defines a number of services to be required including a Timing Failure Detection service. This paper has discussed several important aspects related to the provision of this service and a protocol with perfect timing failure detection properties has been presented. We have shown that clock synchronization is not an essential requirement to be able to timely detect timing failures. Some general issues relative to the TFD service interface have finally been discussed.

To conclude, we consider the implementation of a fully-fledged TCB prototype to be a long-term goal.

We are currently doing research on the requirements for an adequate and generic interface between control and payload modules exhibiting any degree of synchrony.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Christof Fetzer and Flaviu Cristian for extensive discussion on these issues.

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